2 delegitimize the ethnically conscious Slovene leaders as inauthentic or potentially treasonous, and thus separate them from the rest of Slovene speakers. 3 After sketching the trajectory of celebration in the First Austrian Republic and in the Third Reich this article seeks to show how German national anti-Slovene attitudes gained ground in the 10 October celebrations of the first fifteen years of the Second Republic. While not overlooking those countervailing forces which sought to redefine the celebrations as an affirmation of Austrian anti-Nazi identity, it concludes that they were too weak and fragmented to counter the resurgent German nationalism. Though modified and adapted to the changed conditions and not necessarily neo-Nazi in tendency, this offered a similar 'utopian' vision as had sustained Nazi rule -a Carinthia 'freed of' Slovene culture and language.
No discussion of the 10 October celebrations can ignore the controversies which have frequently accompanied them. One way to tackle them methodologically is offered by the recent shift, in the wake of the 'memory turn', to a scrutiny of the politics of commemoration themselves. 4 The following article seeks to continue this by examining the space between Kärnten 1945 Kärnten -1955 3 public discourse and the politics which both underpinned it and was reflected in it. That involves examining published discourse, in particular press reports, but also exploring the politics which underpinned them. 5 The assumption throughout is that while collective memory is rarely monolithic the politics of commemoration is driven by the attempt to make it seem so and thus attain what is sometimes called 'Deutungshoheit' [interpretative hegemony]. 6 I At the risk of oversimplifying a complex and messy field this discussion distinguishes three strands of the commemorative politics. The first emerged out of the 1920 plebiscite vote and the military confrontation which preceded it. It celebrated the outcome as a victory of Deutschtum and called for the sacrifices to be given meaning by converting the dissenting pro-Yugoslav 40% to loyalty to Carinthia. As the Verweser (provincial administrator) Arthur
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Lemisch put it in a famous speech, those who had been 'seduced' into voting for Yugoslavia would have to be returned to Kärntnertum [Carinthiandom] Vorurteilen und Feindbildern (Klagenfurt, 1989) .
4
Despite Lemisch's ostensible caution it is hard to ignore the impact of context of war and military values on the following celebrations. At their centre was the military prowess of the Carinthian militia who had fought Serbian troops in 1918-9. Their courageous initial resistance, it was declared, had led the Allies to decide to hold a plebiscite in the first place.
In that sense the victory of 10. October had been 'erkämpft' [won by force]. The fact that this resistance had been against the military odds (it ended with a Serb occupation of Klagenfurt) elevated the courage and love of Heimat of the Abwehrkämpfer onto a higher plane, which lay deeper than calculation and Realpolik. Yet the danger, though averted, was still lurking south of the Karawanken mountain range, and from the Slovene 'enemy within'. There was also a strong anti-Viennese element in this commemoration, the Staatsregierung [State Governent] was accused of having 'left the province in the lurch' in its hour of greatest need.
Admittedly the related assumption that Carinthia's -and Austria's -destiny and economic survival were to be found in Anschluss with Germany was widely held across the political spectrum, including Social Democracy. But in Carinthia (and Styria) it became part of a radicalised pan-German 'borderland myth'.
A second commemorative strand celebrated the plebiscite result as a victory of progress and republicanism against monarchy, organised religion and reaction, and placed the role of workers and soldiers councils in urban centres like Ferlach centre stage. Its understanding of democracy was 'majoritarian' which meant that it gave little space to the minority's cultural or linguistic difference. 8 A third commemorative strand, which understood the plebiscite outcome as a humiliation for the nationally conscious Slovenes, and sought to remedy this within the new state boundaries, was articulated only weakly. It had been glimpsed at in the resolution which the Carinthian Landtag had passed on the eve of the plebiscite that they den slowenischen Landsleuten ihre sprachliche und nationale Eigenart jetzt und allezeit wahren will und dass deren geistigen und wirtschaftlichen Aufblühen dieselbe Fürsorge angedeihen lassen wird wie den deutschen Bewohner des Landes.
[wish to preserve for their Slovene countrymen their linguistic and national identity now and for all time and will provide the same concern for their spiritual and economic blossoming as for that of the German inhabitants of the province.] 10 Some years later the Social Democrats initiated negotiations on cultural autonomy, which might have given this commitment concrete form. In the end the talks foundered on a central point: how should membership of the proposed autonomous collective be determined? The position of the dominant parties was that it should rest on an individual 'Bekenntnis'
[affirmation] of all adults. However, for minority leaders that appeared to leave individual 6 Slovenes, most of whom were on the bottom rungs of the social ladder, exposed to political and economic pressure to declare their loyalty to German Carinthia; their alternative was to give a Volksrat [National Council] wide powers, including the power to send children to Slovene schools. As one Slovene leader put it, the Council would be able to make children learn Slovene, 'ob die Eltern couragiert sind oder nicht' [whether their parents are courageous or not]. 11 The 'German parties' rejected this as a denial of 'parental rights' and an attempt to reverse the plebiscite result. In May 1929 negotiations collapsed amid mutual recriminations.
Thereafter the minority's position was steadily eroded, apart from a short period when Slovene clerical leaders found some shared ground in the anti-modern Catholic ideology of the 'Ständestaat'. However, after 1936 their (limited) support in Vienna counted for little as support for the illegal Nazi party undermined the effectiveness of the federal government. 12 Under Nazi rule, militaristic version of 10 October celebrations was further radicalised to fit in with the needs of state propaganda and education policy. 13 First the Anschluss, then the war was hailed as the natural continuation of the earlier struggle. For many radical Nazis At the 30th anniversary of the plebiscite in 1950 the tensions between foreign policy concerns and provincial pressures can be seen. On the one hand, although Austria was still occupied, the southern border was no longer on the international agenda; policy-makers in Vienna wanted to move to a less strained relationship with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the provincial dynamics which for five years had inflated the border issue could not simply be turned off. In a cabinet discussion of the approaching anniversary on 11 June 1950 ministers on both sides of the grand coalition expressed scepticism about the Carinthian claim to 'exceptionalism'. Yet, while they were suspicious about German nationalism in the province they were cautious about confronting it. Last not least, the discussion reminds us of the universal truth that celebrations cost money. In this case the Carinthian government requested federal support to the tune of 163 million Schillings for a range of investment projects. 28 [We can't suddenly start downplaying Carinthia. Hopefully even the Carinthians will see that the size of the demand can't be taken seriously. Above all they want a generous investment. And we won't be able to prevent them making as big song and dance as possible].
A discussion of the economic plight of other deprived areas (including parts of Lower Austria) followed. Graf's claim to 'Carinthian exceptionalism' may not have been accepted but his main political concern -to keep the VdU at a distance from the celebrations -was not Three years after the signature of the State Treaty the pressure and lobbying against the bilingual school paid off. The SPÖ governor Ferdinand Wedenig, one of the few prominent supporters of the bilingual school, was forced by pressure from his own party to allow parents to remove their children from bilingual instruction. A short, frenetic campaign of intimidation and 'persuasion' of Slovene parents followed. Its success was shown by the dramatic decline in the number of children learning Slovene. The number of children learning both languages fell from over 12,000 to over 2,000 (in a population of about 60-85,000 Slovene speakers). 37 In some schools children were deregistered from Slovene even though their German was poor [ethnic] differences (along with other kinds) in the interests of unity. 41 But the grass-roots had its own dynamics. One implication of 'the politics of disturbance' was that celebration should not be allowed to lead to complacency. The province was still in danger from the Slav South, the struggle had to continue. 42 39 Meeting in Klagenfurt, 8 November 1959, ÖStA, AdR, BKA AA, pol-50/Österreich 10/ 136.164-249.808 . 1941 -1945 /Viri o nacistični raznarodovalni politiki v Sloveniji 1941 -1945 (Maribor, Založba Obzorja, 1980 ), 171 431-2, doc 220 (Meeting, 15 May 1942 . Persönlichkeiten der Buchhandlung empfohlen, um Zwischenfälle zu vermeiden, den Namen des Dichters sichtbar auf der Büste anzubrigen, was auch geschah.
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[The police has suggested to the book shop that, so to avoid incidents based on the possible confusion of the two personalities Voranc and Tito, they should make the name of Voranc visible on the bust, which was subsequently done]. 43
Two days before the official celebration 2,500 German national fraternity students, including members 
